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Product standards can have a dual impact on production 
and trade costs. Standards may impose additional 
costs on exporters as it may be necessary to adapt 
products for specific markets (cost-effect). In contrast, 
standards can reduce exporters’ information costs if 
they convey information on industrial requirements 
or consumer tastes that would be costly to collect in 
the absence of standards (informational-effect). Using 
a new World Bank database of European standards for 
electronic products, the authors examine the impact 
of internationally-harmonized European standards on 
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European Union imports. They find that European 
Union standards for electronic products that are 
harmonized to international standards have a positive 
and significant effect on trade. The results suggest 
that efforts to promote trade in electronic products 
could be complemented by steps to promote standards 
harmonization. This might include, for example, re-
starting talks to extend the Information Technology 
Agreement to non-tariff measures and commitments to 
harmonize national standards in electronic products. 
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“…it is important to keep in mind the contribution that an ambitious initiative to cut 
barriers to trade in industrial products, such as the ITA, can make to development 




World Trade Organization 




The expansion of trade in electronics and information technology goods has contributed 
in a major way to productivity growth, human welfare, and societal change.  Increasingly 
powerful electronic and digital equipment enables lower cost accounting and 
management systems that increase productivity in offices around the world, for example.  
Access to radio and television programs in schools allow people in remote villages the 
opportunity to access to a world of information and knowledge. Handheld computers 
provide real time data and monitoring of costs for goods in transit, access to medical 
records to speed diagnosis of patients in hospitals, and allow farmers in developing 
countries minute to minute information on crop prices.  In addition, investing in 
expanding this sector in developing countries generates positive spillovers in terms of 
technology transfer and innovation. These are some of the benefits that electronic 
products provide – driven by innovation, lower costs of production, and trade. 
 
Global trade in the information technology and electronic products doubled over the 
period 1997 to 2005, totaling over $1.4 trillion (WTO 2007). Developing countries have a 
particularly large stake in benefiting from expanding access to electronic products.  They 
have also increasingly participated in the production and assembly of these products, in 
part as a function of the continued global dispersion of steps in the manufacturing process 
that has taken place over the past several decades.   
 
Ways to promote trade and lower the cost for producers and consumers is at the forefront 
of policy debate and discussion in the electronics sector. Removing non-tariff barriers to 
trade and building on models of success, such as the Information Technology Agreement 
(ITA)
1,
 which cut tariffs to zero on 97% of world trade of a list of information technology 
products defined during negotiations, is one option for consideration.  Discussions on 
 
1 The Information Technology Agreement (ITA), negotiated in 1996, is a remarkable example of an 
agreement that successfully achieved sectoral liberalization under WTO’s auspices. At the origin, IT-
producing nations agreed to bind their MFN tariffs at zero for a specific list of IT goods that included 
computers, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and electronic instruments. The agreement stated that 
zero tariffs were to be reached by 2000, although some developing nations had a longer phase-in period 
(2005 being the latest possible date).  In addition, zero-tariff bindings achieved under ITA were on an MFN 
basis and thus available to exports from any other WTO member.  A key provision in the 1996 agreement 
stipulated that it would come into effect only if nations accounting for at least 90 per cent of world IT trade 
had signed. The original negotiators did not meet this threshold in 1996, but nine more nations signed up by 
the March 1997 deadline and the agreement came into force. Legal texts and more references can be found 
in the WTO page on ITA: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/inftec_e/inftec_e.htm   3
                                                
extension of the ITA, which includes coverage of more electronic products, to non-tariff 
measures —including standards— began shortly after the ITA was signed in 1996
2.  
 
Facilitating trade by harmonizing product standards to international ones is one possible 
way, among others in building on the ITA to address non-tariff measures. Moreover, the 
WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement encourages harmonization of standards and 
includes the Code of Good Practice to promote this objective. Concrete options to 
achieve wider use of international standards in support of the Agreement have 
specifically been discussed in the electronics sector
3, and a number of initiatives are 
underway in regional organizations to harmonize standards.
4 
 
Does harmonization of regional standards to international ones affect trade? Is the impact 
of international standard harmonization in electronics different respect to other sectors, 
say textiles and apparel? Using a new World Bank database of European standards for 
electronic products, this study examines the net impact of internationally-harmonized 
European standards on EU imports. To our knowledge, this is the first study to directly 
evaluate the impact of international harmonization of standards on trade flows for the 
electronics sector. In the closest article related to this research, Moenius (2006b) studies 
the role of international harmonization of standards on trade flows of product that depend 
on electricity. He defines international harmonization as bilaterally shared standards 
among an importing-exporting country pair. We take advantage of the features of our 
dataset to widen this definition as we consider internationally harmonized standards as 
those standards that are aligned with worldwide practices defined by global institutions. 
We consider this a more accurate framework to analyze the role of international 
synchronization in standards on trade flows. 
 
This paper leverages a new data set of European and international standards collected by 
the World Bank. The data set includes European standards for electrical, electronic and 
related products over the period 1990-2006. We quantify the differentiated effect on trade 
of European standards that are internationally harmonized against those that are not. Our 
main finding is that internationally-harmonized EU standards expand EU imports of 
electronic products. Conversely, European standards that are not aligned with 
international norms have a lower effect on EU imports, or even a negative one. This is the 
first paper to find robust evidence on the positive trade effects of international 
harmonization in electronic products. The results contrast with Czubala et al. (2008), who 
 
2 On 2000, the Committee of Participants on the Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products 
(ITA Committee) agreed on its “Non-Tariff Measures Work Programme” (contained in WTO document 
G/IT/19). This document aimed to identify NTM which were impediments for trade and to examine the 
economic and developmental impact of such measures on trade in ITA products. 
 
3 As a matter of fact, in September 2008 the EU submitted a proposal (G/IT/W/28) to review and initiate 
negotiations to update the ITA. On non-tariff barriers it proposed, “... agreement on substantive provisions 
concerning the recognition of internationally agreed standards and of methods of conformity assessment, in 
order to avoid multiple testing and enable greater economies of scale without compromising on product 
safety”. 
4 There are a number of initiatives underway in regional trade and industry groups to harmonize standards 
in electronic and electrical products.  These include; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Pan American Standards Commission (COPANT), among 
others.   4
found that international harmonization of EU standards has a negative effect on imports, 
although milder than the effect exerted by the EU standards that are not internationally 
harmonized. A possible explanation for this differentiated effect resides on the benefits of 
the information that standards convey, regarding industrial requirements, interoperability, 
or consumer tastes in the importing country (informational effect), which are likely to be 
higher the more complex a good is. In the case of standards for electronic products, the 
informational benefits seem to outpace the costs of complying with standards.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Next section briefly explains the standards 
development system in Europe as it relates to electronics products. It also provides an 
overview of the literature on standards harmonization and trade. The third section 
describes the new World Bank database on electronic standards. We present our 
empirical model and estimates in section four. Finally, we conclude by providing a 
summary of questions for further research and policy implications for consideration 
based on our results. 
 
2. Product Standards, Harmonization and the Electronic Sector 
 
Product standards and technical regulations set out product characteristics, related 
processes and production methods. The World Trade Organization (WTO) differentiates 
them by its compliance degree: a technical regulation is mandatory, while a product 
standard is voluntary. In practice, this distinction is blurred, as public agencies often use 
standards to achieve regulatory goals (Hanson 2005). Standards affecting electronic 
products cover a wide range of product specifications. They include for example, safety 
requirements for sewing machines (EN 60204-31) and measures of electromagnetic 
emissions from integrated circuits (EN 61967)
5. This paper aims at evaluating whether 
harmonization of electronic standards with international norms has an impact on trade 
flows. To our knowledge, this question has not yet been empirically explored. 
 
The following section describes the institutional setting of product standardization in 
Europe, including reference to the international system for standardizing electronic 
products.   We also summarize the literature on the effects of internationally harmonized 
standards on trade flows.   
 
2.1. Institutional Standard-Setting Processes 
 
Product standards have been part of trade policy forums for several decades. Since its 
creation in 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) contained general 
provisions relevant to technical regulations and standards. At the conclusion of the Tokyo 
Round in 1979 thirty-two GATT contracting parties signed the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement). In the Uruguay Round members elaborated on these 
rules in 1995 to create a revised TBT Agreement which is binding on all WTO members.  
 
                                                 
5 Even though standards pursue an important number of benefits, such as facilitating exchange of 
information between producers and consumers, interoperability of products, and promotion of 
environmental protection and safety, they can also be means of hidden protection. Matutes and Regibeau 
(1996), Blind (2004), and Swan (2000) provide a discussion on the positive and negative effects of product 
standardization.    5
                                                
Concurrently with the TBT Agreement, the European Union adopted a “New Approach 
to technical harmonization and standardization” in 1985, was aiming at simplifying the 
movement of goods throughout the European Union (EU) and the European Free Trade 
Area (EFTA). New Approach Directives are confined to outlining “essential 
requirements” or regulatory objectives associated with the manufacturing of products, 
mainly related to safety. The regulatory framework applies either directly to final 
electronic goods or indirectly to electronic components used in other goods. Table 1 lists 
the Directive areas for which CENELEC has issued harmonized standards.  
 
Table 1  here 
 
Compliance with the New Approach Directives’ is compulsory for the free movement of 
certain or covered products within the EU. The system in place does not, however, 
specify how specific objectives, such as consumer protection through product safety, 
should be achieved. This role is fulfilled by European standards published by 
supranational standardization bodies, such as the European Committee for 
Standardization (CEN) or the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization 
(CENELEC). The latter institution prepares and publishes standards relevant to the 
electronic sector. These standards are “harmonized” EU standards and member countries 
are obliged to adopt them and withdraw any national standard that might conflict with 
them.  
 
If a manufacturer chooses to produce a product according to these harmonized standards, 
the product carries the “CE” marking, which implies compliance with the “essential 
requirements” mandated by law in Europe. On the other hand, manufacturers may use 
other technical specifications when manufacturing a product provided there is 
documentation certifying that the product meets the “essential requirements” formulated 
in the European Directives. By 2006, the number of harmonized standards linked to 
compliance with New Approach Directives account for 27.3 percent of the total stock of 
standard published by CENELEC
6. The remaining standards are market driven and are 
not referenced in relation to compliance with the New Approach Directives.  
 
The decision making process to create a standard in CENELEC consists of three stages 
elapsed in general over a three year period. The first stage involves producing a draft 
standard prepared by a CENELEC technical committee. This step requires a project 
proposal emanating from one of four possible bodies: CENELEC’s own technical bodies, 
CENELEC’s Cooperating partners
7, the International Electrotechnical Commision (IEC), 
or the national committees themselves. The second stage involves an enquiry procedure 
 
6 CENELEC facts & figures as of January 2008. 
http://www.cenelec.eu/Cenelec/CENELEC+in+action/News+Centre/CENELEC+in+figures/Default.htm 
7 A cooperating partner is an independent European or international organization representing, with a 
sufficient degree of representativity within its defined area of competence, a sector or subsector of the 
electrotechnical field. Examples of such bodies are: The European Committee for Cooperation of the 
Machine Tool Industries (CECIMO); The European Coordination Committee of the Radiological, 
Electromedical and Medical IT Industries (COCIR); and The European Electronic Component 
Manufacturers Association (EECA), among others.   6
                                                
among CENELEC members
8 to comment on the draft. After the comments are 
incorporated into the document, a final draft is sent for vote. At this third stage members’ 
votes are weighted according to the size of the country they represent. The approval of a 
standard requires that a majority of the national committees voted in favor of the 
document and that at least 71 percent of the “weighted” votes cast are positive. 
 
At the global level, the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is the 
organization that prepares and publishes international standards for electrical, electronic 
and related technologies. Table 2 reports the procedures to formulate IEC standards. It 
follows a similar procedure to standards formulated under CENELEC, however, the 
voting procedure occurs not only at the approval stage but also at the enquiry stage 
between qualified members. In some instances there is a join effort between IEC and the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) to publish standards related to this 
sector. 
 
Table 2  here 
 
CENELEC standards can be divided into three groups according to their relationship to 
international principles (IEC standards): i) standards identical to international norms, ii) 
standards based on international norms but modified with some specifications added for 
the European market, and iii) purely European standards. For this study, we only 
differentiate between CENELEC standards identical to IEC standards (internationally 
harmonized) from those that are not (non-internationally harmonized). By 2007, 70.1 
percent of CENELEC standards (3,704) were internationally harmonized
9 whereas the 
remaining 22.7 percent were not (1,200). 
 
For example, EU standard EN 61300 is an internationally harmonized standard in 
electronics that is identical to IEC 61300, which outlines the general requirements for 
optical fiber interconnecting devices and passive components. By opposition, standard 
EN 50049-1/A2, which delineates the interconnection requirements for domestic or 
similar electronic equipment, is a purely European standard since there is not an 
international norm equivalent to it. 
 
 
2.2. Internationally Harmonized Standards and Global Trade 
 
The literature about the effect of harmonization standards on international trade is 
limited
10. Until recently, the literature was concentrated on examining the commonly 
held view that block-harmonized standards encourage international trade and that 
 
8 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and  United Kingdom. 
9 CENELEC facts & figures, as of January 2008. 
10 The role of product standards –or more generally, technical barriers to trade (TBT)–, on international 
trade is also recent. At the theoretical level, Baldwin (2000) and Ganslandt and Markusen (2001) propose 
an analytical framework to understand the role of TBT on international flows. At the empirical level, 
Wilson and Otsuki (2004), Blind and Jungmittag (2005), and Chen et al. (2006) have estimated the impact 
of product standards or the effect of their liberalization. WTO (2005) provides a complete overview on the 
relation of product standards and international trade.    7
                                                
country-specific standards are barriers to trade. In this regard, Moenius (2004) finds that 
bilateral share standards are favorable to trade while country-specific standards reduce 
imports for non-manufactured goods and increase imports for manufactured goods in 
Europe. 
 
In a similar study focusing on agricultural products, Moenius (2006a) refutes that 
country-specific standards always block trade since they provide essential information 
about markets and that European harmonized standards always expand trade as they also 
reduce the variety of goods being traded. In conclusion, Moenius work suggests that 
“importer standards tend to hinder trade in simple goods (including agricultural products) 
and promote trade in complex goods (like machinery)”
11. 
 
The first article to consider the differentiated trade impact of “idiosyncratic” national 
standards versus international standards is Swann et al. (1996). Using data from 1985 to 
1991, the authors regress British net exports on count data of country-specific standards 
and international standards in United Kingdom and Germany for 88 manufacturing 
industries. The results indicate that UK-specific standards have a stronger positive effect 
on British net exports than international standards. 
 
Otsuki et al. (2001) is the first case study to directly address the role of internationally 
harmonized standards as opposed to purely European standards on trade flows. They 
employ a gravity model to estimate the impact of European aflatoxin standards on 
imports of groundnut products from Africa during 1988-1998. Results suggested that 
European standards set at the most restrictive level would involve trade flows 
significantly lower than when international standards are adopted.  
 
Regarding the role of EU directives in trade, Chen and Matoo (2008) find that such 
agreements increase trade among EU members but not necessarily with non-members. 
The authors used a detailed panel dataset that identifies the industries influenced by each 
Directive to concluded that developing countries may be the worst affected since their 
firms are likely to be less prepared to comply with stricter standards. Although this article 
does not directly address the role on international harmonization in standards, it sheds 
light on the differentiated impact of EU standardization on third countries. In a closely 
related article, Baller (2007) also finds evidence that the effect of harmonization on third 
countries is positive for industrialized countries and mixed for developing countries. 
 
Using a new World Bank database of EU product standards in the textiles, clothing, and 
footwear sector (EUSDB database), Czubala et al. (2007) consider the impact of 
international harmonization as opposed to purely European standardization at the 
intensive margin. The authors use a gravity model to examine the role of EU standards on 
African exports during the period 1995-2003. They find robust evidence on the negative 
impact of standards on trade, however, they find that internationally harmonized 
standards are less trade restrictive than purely European standards. The policy 
implications of this result suggest that it is indeed appropriated for the TBT Agreement to 
champion the use of international standards whenever possible and that it is no just 
technical regulations that can have a significant impact on trade. 
 
11 Moenius (2006a), page 3.   8
 
Building on Czubala et al, Shepherd (2007) examines the impact of internationally 
harmonized standards on the extensive margin of trade at the sectoral level. He suggests 
that although product standards have a negative impact on partner country export variety, 
international harmonization acts as a mitigating factor. The result is consistent with 
numerical simulations on a three-country version of Melitz (2003) model in which 
harmonization is beneficial at the extensive margin. The empirical results indicate that a 
10% increase in the total number of standards reduces export variety by 6% meanwhile a 
10% increase in the proportion of internationally harmonized standards leads to a 0.2% 
increase in export variety. 
 
Finally, Moenius (2006b) is the only paper having focused on products that depend on 
electricity. He studies the different impacts of country-specific standards and standards 
shared by the exporting and the importing country. The author defines the latter as 
international harmonized standards and, in a gravity framework, concludes that both 
types of standards promote trade flows. He also finds that national standardization 
dominates bilateral standardization and that electricity-dependent products benefit more 
from international standardization than manufacturing products. At the empirical level, 
the fact that the base specification entails a regression of import flows on only dummy 
variables is worrisome. 
 
3. The World Bank EU Electrotechnical Standards Database (EUESDB) 
 
The European Union Electrotechnical Standards Database (EUESDB) compiles European 
Standards for electrotechnical products
12 over the period 1990-2007, and maps them to 
the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). The database provides counts of 
the number of standards and their relation with international principles. This section 
presents the methodology as well as some description of the standardization activity in 
electronic goods.  
 
In an effort to increase the availability of empirical data on standards, the new EUESDB 
is based upon the methodology proposed in Czubala’s (2007) in assembling the European 
Union Standards Database in textiles, clothing, and agricultural products. Accordingly, 
the Perinorm database (www.perinorm.com) is used to extract the standards published by 
CENELEC. This approach has been employed previously in studies by Swann et al. 
(1996) and Moenius (2000, 2004, and 2006).  
 
Perinorm is a subscription-only database of national, European and International product 
standards developed by the British Standard Institute (BSI), the Association Française de 
Normalisation (AFNOR) and the Deutsches Institut für Normung (DIN). It contains more 
than 1.1 million records from 23 countries, in addition to international bodies such as ISO 
and IEC and supranational organizations such as CEN and CENELEC. At this stage, 
EUESDB does not include data on national standards from individual EU member 
states
13. 
                                                 
12 According to the IEC (http://www.iec.ch), the term electrotechnical refers to electrical, electronic and 
related technologies. 
13 There are three reasons for this omission: First, a considerable number of national standards are in fact 
supranational standards implemented at the national level. Second, data availability varies considerably   9
                                                                                                                                                
 
Each record in the Perinorm dataset corresponds to a single national, regional, or 
international standard. Each observation has information on its title, the history of 
versions, its international relationship, its classification, the original language, the issuing 
body, the publication date, the withdraw date (if applies) and a brief description of it. 
Only those documents classified as European standards (coded as “EN”) in Perinorm are 
included in the count database.  
 
We use that information to build an inventory of the “stock” of active standards
14 for a 
given product-year in the electrotechnical sector. As Perinorm classifies standards 
according to the International Classification of Standards (ICS), standards are matched to 
products using Blind’s (2004) concordance between ICS classification and SITC revision 
2 classification
15. A standard is considered to be in force for a given year if it was 
published before or during the year in question and (if applicable) if it was withdrawn 
after the same year. Amendments to existing standards are counted as additional 
standards. A standard is considered internationally harmonized if it is “identical” to an 
existing IEC standard. For instance, European standard EN 61965 delineates the 
mechanical safety of cathode ray tubes
16. It was introduced in 2002 and modified in 
2003, so it appears as active standard from 2002 on. It is considered as internationally 
harmonized since it implements IEC standard IEC 61965. This standard applies to SITC 
776 which included thermionic, cold and photo–cathode valves, tubes and parts. 
 
The extent of international harmonization varies mainly due to the introduction on new 
harmonized standards. From the total stock of internationally harmonized standards 
active in 2007 (1,447), 86% were new standards. The rest are either internationally 
harmonized standards that were active over the full sample (11 %) or some pre-existing 
non-harmonized standards that were replaced by harmonized standards (3%).  
 
It is worth noting the limitations of the data set. Even though the count variable is a proxy 
of the number of standards an exporter should comply with, it is not possible to identify 
the level of technical complexity among those standards affecting a given product. 
Previous attempts to include the number of pages of each standard as a proxy for its 
technical complexity proved unworkable, we believe, as Perinorm records the number of 
pages of each standard in its original language, which may differ among standards.  
 
Table 3  here 
 
 
across EU member countries. Third, as supranational standards are relatively recent, it is more feasible to 
obtain accurate stock data for them than for national standards. 
14 The primary variable of interest is the total number of standards with which an exporter’s product should 
comply during a particular year. 
15 An advantage of this automatically mapping over the manual mapping used in Czubala et al. (2007) is its 
transparency and automation. On the other hand, the manual mapping has the benefit of allowing a finer 
level of product-detail. This advantage might be partly offset by the considerable room for the exercise of 
the analyst’s judgment. 
16 Cathode ray tubes are electronic vacuum tubes that use focused electron beams to display images. They 
are most famous for their use in such things as televisions, computer and radar displays, and automated 
teller machines.    10
From the complete stock of electrotechnical standards, we extracted those standards 
directly related to electronic goods from 1990 to 2006. In an attempt to consider groups 
of homogenous goods where standards entail similar technical requirements among 
products, we distinguish between three groups of electronics: i) Electronic components; 
ii) consumer electronics and telecom; and iii) Information technology products. Lall et. al 
(2004) use a similar categorization to study industry fragmentation in electronic products. 
Table 3 reports the SITC categories within each group. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
Table 4 and figure 1 show the evolution of total number of product standards in each 
category. In average, IT products accounts for 11 percent of the overall number of 
standards. The main standardization activity has taken place in categories 1 and 2, in 
average they account for 36 percent and 53 percent of the total number of standards, 
respectively.  
 
Table 5 here 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
The share of internationally harmonized standards (IEC standard) has increased in the 
sample period for electronic products as shown in table 5 and figure 2. This pattern 
differs among subsectors. In 1990, categories 1 and 2 began with a high share of 
international harmonization (almost 90 percent), partly due to the small number of 
standards in those categories. While the EU standardization process increased over time, 
the share of internationally harmonized standards temporarily decreased reaching its 
lowest level in 1993 for category 1 (36 percent) and in 1996 for category 2 (69.2 percent). 
From that point on, the share of international harmonization has remained constant for 
category 2 whereas it has increased in category 1 to reach 70 percent in 2006. Category 3 
has a lower initial value (30 percent) in 1990, it reached it lowest point in 1992 (20 
percent) to begin increasing until reach a level of 23 percent in 2006 (figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 here 
 
It is worth mentioning that the percentage of international harmonization tends to 
converge on the 70% to 80% range for the stock of standards of each sub-sector. This 
pattern may be the result of the implementation of the Dresden Agreement in 1996, 
which lays down a set of parameters to expedite the collaboration between IEC and 
CENELEC in the preparation and publication of international standards. 
 
4.  Model and Estimation Results 
 
In this section, we provide the basic intuition for the empirical question we examine in 
this research. Next, we present an empirical model and discuss the econometric strategy 
as well as our estimates. Since we attempt to make the basic mechanisms underlying the 
model as clear as possible, we keep the theoretical presentation highly stylized.  
Product standards can have a dual impact on costs, and therefore on trade. On the one 
hand, they may impose additional fixed costs (or even variable costs) on exporters as it 
may be necessary to alter production processes to adapt products to such standards in the 
importing country. Moreover, a producer willing to export to several markets may be 
confronted to idiosyncratic standards specific to each markets, and compliance with them 
may further inflate production costs.
17 Moreover, certification aiming to certify 
compliance with this set of rules can generate additional costs for the exporter.  
 
On the other hand, product standards can potentially reduce exporter’s information costs 
if they convey information as to industrial requirements, or consumer tastes in the 
importing country, that would be costly to collect in the absence of standards. Compared 
to other sectors where the complexity of goods is lower, such as textiles and clothing,   
the information conveyed by standards in the electronic sector may be relatively more 
valuable,—as it would facilitate the performance and interoperability of devices and 
components—  and the benefits of standardization seem to outpace its compliance costs.   
 
4.1. Empirical Model 
 
To examine the differentiated impact of internationally harmonized and non-harmonized 
standards on EU imports of electronic goods, we use a standard gravity model of 
international trade applied to data on EU-15 imports from the rest of the world
18. 
Individual EU standards in electronics often tend to be applied across numerous product 
lines, which make it convenient to aggregate the trade data to a higher level of generality.   
 
As starting point, we take the micro-founded gravity model formulation of Anderson and 
Van Wincoop (2003, 2004) and adapt it to the electronics sector: 
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where:   = Country j imports from country i in category k for year t;  = Production 
of country i in sector k for year t;   = Expenditure of country j in category k for year t; 








t Y k   = Elasticity of substitution in 
category k;   = Trade costs facing exports from country i to country j in category k for 
year t; ;   = Country i’s output share in category k for year t;   = Country j’s 
expenditure share in category k for year t; and   = Random error term, satisfying the 
usual assumptions. The inward resistance term,  , captures 
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17 This assumption could be tested if a database similar to the one in the EU would exist for other markets.  
  11
18 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, ,Sweden, and  United Kingdom. outward resistance term,  , describes the dependence of 
exports from country i on trade costs across all importers. 
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We modify the bilateral trade costs component,  , in the standard model (1) as to 
explicitly include our standards count variables. Ideally, the model would require data on 
the direct costs of compliance with standards for the categories we use. Unfortunately, 
such data is not available at the categories level, let alone at the firm level, and we are 
forced to resort to count-variables as proxies that capture the effects of standards. Indeed, 
other empirical papers resort to standards count, see for instance Czubala et al (2007) for 
EU standards on apparel and textiles, as well as by Swann (1996) and Moenius (2000, 
2004, and 2006). 
 
Our standards count variables make a distinction between the number of EU standards 
internationally harmonized with IEC standards ( ) in product category k and the 
number of EU standards not internationally harmonized ( ). By defining the 
standards count variable at the product category, we allow for uneven effects of standards 
on trade across categories, as the number of standards per product-category k diverges. 
We also include in the trade cost function  , an import-weighted average of 
applied tariffs to category k levied by EU importers to exports from country i, as 
explained below. Finally, the trade cost function also includes, as is usual in this 
literature, the distance between pairs of trading countries (dist) as proxy for transport 
costs, as well as dummy variables to take into account important geographical and 
cultural links such as colonial links (Dcolony), and a common official language 
(Dcomlang). We also control for the differentiated impact of exports from the ten 
European countries that formally acceded to the EU in 2004, by including a dummy 
(DEU_memb) that equals one when exporter i is one of the ten countries in 2004 or a 
subsequent year, and zero elsewhere. Furthermore, as part of EU-accession, the ten 
countries had also benefited from zero-tariff preferences in the EU for several sectors – 
including manufacturing- since 1998, prior becoming full EU-members. Therefore, zero-
tariffs were applied by EU-15 countries on the export of electronic products of these 
countries from 1998 onwards
k
k
t std NIH _
19, as captured by the applied tariff variable in the estimates. 
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(2) 
As to implement the estimation procedure, Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003, 2004) 
suggest that the model can be simplified by replacing the “multilateral resistance” terms 
with appropriate fixed effects. In this case, a strict interpretation of their structural model 
in a panel context would require fixed effects in the importer-sector-time, exporter-
sector-time, and sector-time dimensions. However, this approach is difficult to implement 
  12
                                                 
19 For an account of EU enlargement issues, see for instance Breuss (2002)   13

as it requires estimation of a large number of parameters, a problem accentuated in our 
case by the large number of countries. For our baseline model (3), we therefore prefer a 
simpler formulation using fixed effects only in the exporter (θj), importer (δi) and 
product-year   t k     dimensions. The last term has the advantage of controlling for 
unobserved effects time-varying effects specific to each category of electronics that are 
likely to influence trade, such as technological innovation. The importer and exporter 
fixed effects control for country-specific unobserved factors.  
 
Plugging (2) into (1) and replacing the “multilateral resistance” terms with appropriate 
fixed effects, we obtain: 
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Our panel covers three categories of electronic products described in Table 3 imported by 
the EU-15 countries from 131 countries exporting countries
20 over the period 1990-2006. 
Export and tariff data were compiled through WITS from COMTRADE and TRAINS, 
respectively under the SITC revision-2 nomenclature. Core gravity variables, such as 
bilateral distances, colonial and common language dummies, were obtained from the 
CEPII web-site
21. Data on standards was explained in section 3. 
 
Exports to the EU in electronics have increased over time. In average, information 
technology products represent 50 percent of electronic exports to the EU meanwhile 
consumer electronics and electronic components represent 32 percent and 18 percent, 
respectively (figure 4). Table 6 shows EU import composition by exporter regions. East 
Asian & Pacific countries are clearly the major source of EU imports, with exports 
accounting for more than 80 percent in each category.  
 
Figure 4 here 
 
Table 6 here 
 
As shown in figure 5, EU tariffs for electronic products decreased continuously as the 
electronics sector experienced a period of sustained liberalization. This pattern coincides 
with the implementation of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), a sectoral 
tariff-cutting multilateral agreement negotiated by an important number of WTO member 
countries in 1996 for several IT products.
22 
                                                 
20 The sample size for 131 exporting countries, 15 importing countries, 3 electronic categories, and 17 years 
is 100,215. 
21 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm 
22 ITA set tariffs for all products listed in its Declaration at a zero-level after an implementation period. As 
to the three categories we consider, almost half (47%) of their number of tariff lines were affected by ITA, 
accounting for 25 % of total EU imports volume in these categories  




The econometric strategy was guided by the trade-offs resulting from the presence of a 
large number of observations with zero-exports in the data: about 57 percent of 
observations. To deal with zero-exports, estimations were carried out with several 
econometric methods, using a logarithmic transformation in the dependent variable to 
avoid giving too much weight to observations with a high-volume of exports.  However, 
the use of logarithms brings in a truncation problem for observations with zero-exports. 
The standard solution in the literature (see for instance Frankel et al. (1997)) consisted of 
shifting all export values by one dollar before applying the logarithmic transformation, so 
that the dependent variable in (3)   
k
ijt M  1 ln . This increases the mean of exports by one 
unit without affecting its variance. In addition, with this correction, product categories 
with zero exports are linked to zero values of the dependent variable.  Then, Tobit 
estimation may appropriately account for the censorship of the dependent variable.   
However, as shown by de Melo and Portugal-Perez (2008), coefficient estimates can be 
very sensitive to this (arbitrary) choice of adding one dollar. Therefore, it is prudent to 
explore alternatives. 
 
Eaton and Tamura (ET 1995) proposed to estimate a variation of the Tobit model in 
which the independent variable is   
k
ijt v M a  ln
v a
 and the maximum likelihood (ML) 
function is modified to endogenize the choice of the    parameter. Then, the ML 
estimator includes an estimate of the value of   among the set of estimates which means 
that the dependent variable will be censored at the value 
v a
  v a ln  (see Appendix A for 
details on the Eaton Tamura (ET) tobit Model). 
 
Along the same lines, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (SS-T) (2006) propose a Poisson Pseudo 
Maximum Likelihood (PPML) model to deal with heteroskedasticity in constant-
elasticity models, such as log-linear gravity models. Using Monte-Carlo simulations, they 
show that that the PPML produce estimates with the lowest bias for different patterns of 
heteroskedasticity. However, Martin and Pham (2008) noticed that the data-generating 
process used by SS-T did not produce zero-values properly.  When correcting the data-
generating process to obtain a sample with an important amount of zero-value 
observations –a situation closer to ours – Martin and Pham find that the ET-Tobit 
estimates have a lower bias than those obtained with the PPML estimator. 
 
The above formulation captures the impact of trade costs on bilateral trade volumes. 
However, the impact that we are capturing is conditional on trade taking place between 
the two countries, i.e. on  . Zero or missing trade flows are excluded from the 
effective sample in (3), which has been shown to bias the resulting coefficient estimates 
(e.g., Helpman et al., 2008). Moreover, equation (3) on its own does not allow us to say 
anything about the second part of our working hypothesis, which has to do with export 
propensity. Ideally, one would want to implement a two-stage procedure in which a 




  14second stage a decision is taken on volume (outcome equation) as in Helpman, Melitz 
and Rubinstein (2008)
 23.  Indeed, we also estimate a Heckman (1979) sample selection 
model. Such an approach requires an appropriate exogenous instrument that would 
influence only the decision to export in the first-stage and not the volume of exports in 
the second stage in order to comply with the exclusion restrictions of the two-stage 
method. At this high level of disaggregation with panel data, the only potential 
instrument in this data set would be the lagged decision to export (represented by a 
dummy that is equal to one if the product was exported from country i to country j in the 
preceding period).
24  However, since there is not much heterogeneity in this indicator, we 
are also inclined to retain ET-Tobit estimates. 
 
Another issue to be addressed is the possible endogeneity of the standards count 
variables,  and    in all three types of electronics, to trade flows. The 
number of standards in a particular sector could, in a general sense, be endogenous to 
imports through a political economy process. Moreover, we take into consideration 
exports to the EU from a large group of countries. It is therefore unlikely that sector-wide 
standards in electronics —which apply to both domestic production and imports from all 
sources— are set in response to unexpectedly large imports from a single country in a 
single year. As robustness checks we include alternately in our regressions lagged count 
variables for standards, see below in table 8. Although we do not expect major problems 
with endogeneity in this case, we leave for future research alternative ways of dealing 
with it.  
k
t std H _
k
t std NH _
 
 
4.2. Econometric Results 
 
We first report the results for the baseline equation using the different estimation 
techniques discussed above in the empirical strategy. Then, we carry out robustness 




Table 7 reports the estimates from equation (3) obtained under several estimation 
methods. Column 1 reports the OLS method with the logarithm of exports, ln(M), as 
  15
                                                 
23 The first stage consists of a probit regression that explains the probability that country i exports to 
country j (selection equation), where the dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to one if country i 
exports to country j. The second stage consists of a gravity equation estimated in logarithmic form that 
explains the volume of exports from i to j (outcome equation) and incorporates a term based on estimates of 
the first-stage, known as the inverse Mills-ratio, to correct for the non-random prevalence of zero trade 
flows and intra-sector firm heterogeneity. The two-stage procedure aims at correcting for two potential 
drawbacks prevalent in the estimation of gravity models. First, a standard selection bias can result from the 
necessity to drop observations with zero trade. Second, there is a potential bias due to unobserved firm 
level heterogeneity resulting from an omitted variable that measures the impact of the number of exporting 
firms, an aspect related to the extensive margin in the model.  
 
24 Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) employ a two-stage Heckman estimation procedure in cross-
section estimates. In order to comply with the exclusion restriction condition, they use separately two 
instrumental variables in the first-stage probit excluding them from the second-stage: a common religion 
variable and a variable on the regulation costs of firm entry in a country.   16
                                                
dependent variable. Columns 2 and 3 report Tobit-type of estimates for (3). The 
“standard” Tobit estimates in column 2 account more appropriately for the censorship of 
the dependent variable. Now the dependent variable is the log of imports plus one dollar, 
implying that av=1. However, as discussed before, all coefficient values, are very 
sensitive to the choice of av used to avoid truncation. Column 3 goes one step further and 
reports the ET-Tobit estimates that also estimates the value of av that fits best the data. 
Column 4 and 5 report estimates for the outcome and the selection equations of the 
Heckman selection model. Finally, column 5 reports estimates when applying the Poisson 
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) model recommended by Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro (SS-T) (2006) to deal with heteroskedastic errors in log-linear gravity models.  
 
Table 7 here 
 
Most coefficients are significant with reasonable magnitudes and expected sign across 
estimation methods. Among the standard gravity variables, distance is negative and 
statistically significant, while a colonial relationship (statistically significant) and 
common official language (statistically significant) are both positive.  The coefficient of 
the applied tariff is negative and significant except in the last column for the PPML, 
confirming the negative impact tariffs have on imports. A possible explanation for the 
sign reversal when using the PPML method lies on the fact that the dependent variable is 
in level rather than logarithmic form, giving more weight to extreme observations and, 
the loss in precision being attributable to giving probably too much weight to very noisy 
data at the level at which product categories are defined. 
 
We find that all estimated coefficients for the count of internationally harmonized 
standards in each category of electronics goods are positive and significant across all 
columns. The results are less homogenous for non-harmonized variables. Although 
coefficients for non-harmonized standards in category 3 are all positive, the non-
harmonized standards coefficients in categories 1 and 2 have different signs across 
estimation methods.  However, when non-harmonized standard coefficients are positive, 
their magnitude is always smaller than corresponding coefficients for harmonized 
standards








25 The single exception is the coefficient for category 1 in column 5, but it is the selection equation of the 
Heckman selection model. 
 
26 As standards harmonization seems to reduce the informational asymmetries between producers and 
buyers, the effect should be larger for products that suffer the most from these asymmetries. A possible 
avenue for future extension of this research is to test this hypothesis using variables of technical complexity 
for our defined categories as proxies of the scope for informational asymmetry, as suggested by an 
anonymous referee. A similar identification challenge was faced by Kugler and Verhoogen (2008), who use 
the ratio of total industry advertising and R&D to total industry sales for the US firms from the 1975 U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Line of Business Survey as a measure of the scope for quality 
differentiation.  
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Robustness Checks 
 
For next results, we only report estimates of the ET-Tobit and the Heckman selection 
methods, our preferred ones. We report results for robustness checks in table 8. Column 1 
to 3 report estimates on a sample that excludes the 10 countries having joined the EU in 
2004, whereas columns 4 to 6 report estimates on a sample that reduces the time horizon 
to the period 1996-2006.  Estimates in both sets of specifications are very similar. There 
are two main contrasts with our preferred results in table 7. First, standards count 
coefficients are slightly higher when the samples are reduced.  Second, coefficients for 
non-harmonized standards in category 3 are no longer negative, but they are lower in 
absolute value than coefficients for internationally-harmonized standards.  
 
Table 8 here 
 
Omitted variable bias and measurement error leading to our large estimated values could 
have resulted from omitting the exchange rate differential between exporter and importer 
currency as it could also have an impact on exports.  Nevertheless, when adding the ratio 
of importer/exporter exchange rates (with respect to the dollar), its effect was not 
significant (not reported here).  
 
As noted previously, another potential difficulty with our results is the possible 
endogeneity of our standards measures. To deal with this issue, we re-run estimates in 
columns 3-5 of table 8 using two and five period lags of our standards count variables. 
Table 9 presents the results. Qualitatively, they are identical to our baseline results: 
harmonized standards exert a positive impact on trade values and export propensity, 
where as non-harmonized standards have a mixed result; although in cases where the 
impact is positive it is smaller than for harmonized standards.  With five lags, coefficients 
of standards tend to be significant at least at the 10% in fewer cases. If anything, 
attempting to account for endogeneity by using lag-variables tends to strengthen our 
initial results. 
 
Table 9 here 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This analysis centers on evaluating the impact of international harmonization of 
voluntary standards on trade in electronic goods. We estimated a micro-founded gravity-
type model of trade to find robust empirical evidence on the positive impact of EU 
standards aligned with international norms on both EU import volumes of electronic 
products and the propensity to import. This result remains robust to alternative 
specifications, samples, and estimation methods.   
 
We have also shown the differentiated impact of harmonization on three categories of 
electronics: electronic components, consumer electronics and telecoms, and information 
technology. Although a positive and robust relationship between international 
harmonization and trade seems to appear in all of the three categories, we found that EU-
specific standards not aligned to international norms have a mixed impact on trade across   18
sectors and estimation methods used. Yet, even when the impact of non-harmonized 
standards is found, at best, to be positive, the trade-effect is smaller than with 
internationally harmonized standards.   
 
Compared with previous empirical work on EU standards harmonization in textiles 
undertaken by Czubala et al. (2007) —where internationally harmonized standards were 
shown to have a negative effect on imports from Africa, although a more mitigated 
adverse effect compared to non-harmonized standards— the evidence in this paper 
confirms the importance of international harmonization of standards on the 
commercialization of more complex goods, such as electronics, as well as on their 
production and consumption. 
 
From the empirical point of view, our paper builds on previous empirical work and 
improves it in three fundamental ways. First, we consider the differentiated impact of 
international harmonization across three categories of electronics as opposed to 
considering the average impact on the whole sector.  Second, this paper considers the full 
set of exporters to the EU in a sector, so that selection bias does not become an issue. 
Third, among our estimation techniques explored, we obtain ET-tobit estimates that 
adequately control for the important proportion of observations with zero-exports at the 
disaggregated level.   
 
 
The policy implications of these results are of significant interest. There may be a good 
case for deepening efforts on international harmonization in electronics with a positive 
and significant impact on trade.  Building on the Information Technology Agreement, for 
example, could include talks to undertake commitments to harmonize standards in 
electronics products to international norms.   
 
In regard to future research work, we view two areas of particular interest.  First, there 
may be significant gains from collecting data through firm-surveys in major exporters in 
order to explore the effect of standards at the firm-level.  Second, as the new database of 
EU standards in electronics reveals cross-sectoral variation in the number and type 
(harmonized vs. non-harmonized) of standards, further research on the political economy 
forces that play a role in standard setting behavior may also prove useful. 
   19
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Appendix A. The Eaton-Tamura (ET) Tobit model.   
 
This appendix draws on de Melo and Portugal-Perez (2008) and spells out the ET model 
estimated in the main text and derives expressions for the marginal effects drawing a 
distinction between continuous variables (lumped in vector  
jk
it x ) and dummy variables  
(lumped in vector  
jk
it R ) 
 
A1.The Eaton-Tamura (ET) tobit model  
 






   Z , if   ln
ln
ln                                                               if  ln
jk jk jk jk jk jk jk






              






it M is country k’s imports of apparel variety j from country j at year t, 
jk
it x  is a 
continuous regressor, 
jk
it R  is a dummy variable, and   is endogenously determined in 
the maximum-likelihood procedure. Notice th 0  , and th
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Model (0.1) is equivalent to the constant elasticity model: 
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it Normal    , then    exp
jk
it  is a log-normal random variable. 
 
From model (0.1), the maximum likelihood estimates of   and v a   012 (,,) M     
maximize the log-likelihood function: 
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27, as determined from (0.1) 
 
A2. Evaluating the marginal effects in an ET tobit model 
 
We are interested in calculating the two marginal effects:   
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27 We correct for the typographical errors in the log-likelihood function Eaton and Tamura (1994), page 
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Deriving (0.3), with respect to 
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Furthermore,  if  ij x  is a variable expressed in percent terms (such as a tariff) or a 
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(0.5) 
This semi elasticity can be interpreted as the percent change in imports following a 1% 
increase in the value of the continuous variable  ij x  
 
 
2)      Using the definition of model (0.2), we develop: 
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We are interested in evaluating the percent change of the expected value of positive 
values of the dependent variable (here imports) following a unit-change in the dummy 
jk
it R  (in our case shifting from a double to a single transformation RoO for apparel).  
 











R EM M R
  
     
=    2 exp 1           (0.7) 
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Table 1. New Approach Directives for which CENELEC has issued harmonized 
standards. 
 
Directive Area Directive reference
Electromagnetic Compatibility  2004/108/EC
Explosive Atmospheres 94/9/EC
Gas Appliances 90/396/EEC
Interoperability of European High-speed Railway 96/48/EC
Interoperability of trans-European conventional rail 2001/16/EC
Low-Voltage Equipment 2006/95/EC
Machinery 98/37/EC + 2006/42/EC
Measuring Instruments 2004/22/EC
Medical Devices 93/42/EEC
Medical Devices: Active Implantable 90/385/EEC
Medical Devices: In Vitro Diagnostic 98/79/EC
Non-automatic Weighing Instruments 90/384/EEC
Personal Protective Equipment 89/686/EEC
Pressure Equipment 97/23/EC
Radio & Telecom Terminal Equipment 99/5/EC
Recreational Craft 94/25/EC
Safety of Toys 88/378/EEC
Source: CENELEC, facts and figures (as a January 20008)  
 
 
Table 2. Preparation Stages for IEC Standards. 
 
Project stage Associated Document
Preliminary stage  Preliminary work item 
Proposal stage  New work item proposal
Preparatory stage  Working draft(s)
Committee stage  Committee draft(s)
Enquiry stage  Enquiry draft *
Approval stage  Final draft International Standard*
Publication stage  International IEC Standard 
Source:  ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1
http://www.iec.ch/tiss/iec/Directives-Part1-Ed6.pdf
* A draft is approved if a two-thirds majority of the votes cast 
by P-members of the technical committee are in favour and no 






  25Table 3. Finished Products and Parts and Components in Trade in Electronics 
 
Group  (k) SITC Product
7761 Television picture tubes,cathode ray
7762 Other electr.valves and tubes
7763 Diodes,transistors and sim.semi-conductor devices
7764 Electronic microcircuits
7768 Piezo-electric crystals,mounted,parts of 776-
7611 Television receivers,colour
7612 Television receivers,monochrome
7621 Radio-broadcast receivers for motor vehicles
7622 Radio-broadcast receivers portable,incl.sound rec.
7628 Other radio-broadcast receivers
7631 Gramophones & record players,electric
7638 Other sound recorders and reproducers
7641 Elect.line telephonic & telegraphic apparatus
7642 Microphones,loudspeakers,amplifiers
7643 Radiotelegraphic & radiotelephonic transmitters
7648 Telecommunications equipment
7649 Parts of apparatus of division 76-
7511 Typewritters;cheque-writting machines
7512 Calculating machines,cash registers.ticket & sim.
7518 Office machines, n.e.s.
7521 Analogue & hybrid data processing machines
7522 Complete digital data processing machines
7523 Complete digital central processing units
7524 Digital central storage units,separately consigned
7525 Peripheral units,incl.control & adapting units
7528 Off-line data processing equipment.  n.e.s.
7591 Parts of and accessories suitable for 751.1-,751.8
7599 Parts of and accessories suitable for 751.2-,752-
1. Electronic components
3. Information Technology






  26Table 4. Count by Category of EU Standards in Electronics 
 
Category  
(k) 1 2 3 Total
1990 42 121 40 203
1991 77 134 55 266
1992 111 153 83 347
1993 144 219 89 452
1994 199 272 83 554
1995 260 336 84 680
1996 307 399 75 781
1997 354 531 79 964
1998 405 592 85 1082
1999 445 631 57 1133
2000 480 661 58 1199
2001 524 771 67 1362
2002 604 831 78 1513
2003 657 910 84 1651
2004 679 977 89 1745
2005 644 1026 99 1769
2006 685 1057 107 1849
Source: EUESDB (2008)  
 
Table 5. Count by Type of EU Standards in Each Category 
 
Category  
(k) IEC Standard Non-IEC standard IEC Standard Non-IEC standard IEC Standard Non-IEC standard IEC Standard Non-IEC standard
1990 35 7 107 14 12 28 154 49
1991 40 37 112 22 14 41 166 100
1992 43 68 124 29 15 68 182 165
1993 52 92 165 54 20 69 237 215
1994 83 116 199 73 20 63 302 252
1995 111 149 235 101 23 61 369 311
1996 131 176 276 123 29 46 436 345
1997 161 193 386 145 30 49 577 387
1998 195 210 439 153 34 51 668 414
1999 230 215 473 158 35 22 738 395
2000 267 213 502 159 40 18 809 390
2001 306 218 560 211 46 21 912 450
2002 379 225 617 214 54 24 1050 463
2003 430 227 670 240 57 27 1157 494
2004 462 217 704 273 65 24 1231 514
2005 435 209 735 291 75 24 1245 524
2006 477 208 778 279 86 21 1341 508
Source: EUESDB (2008)
















East Asian & Pacific 83.9% 81.2% 93.2%
Europe and Central Asia 3.3% 14.4% 0.9%
Latin America and Caribbean 7.4% 2.8% 5.1%
Middle East & North Africa 4.3% 0.6% 0.2%
South Asia 0.7% 0.4% 0.3%
Sub-Sahara Africa 0.5% 0.6% 0.3%
100% 100% 100%  
 
  28Table 7 
Base line results with different estimation methods 
   1  2  3  4  5  6 




(selection)  ppml 
0.611 1.118 0.972 0.504 0.065 0.631 1 _ t std H  
   [0.058]*** [0.069]*** [0.059]*** [0.090]*** [0.049]  [0.101]***
0.747 0.848 0.747 0.996 0.807 0.732 2 _ t std H  
   [0.081]*** [0.089]*** [0.075]*** [0.117]*** [0.075]*** [0.149]***
0.73 1.663 1.411 0.865 0.733 1.033 3 _ t std H  
   [0.054]*** [0.045]*** [0.038]*** [0.042]*** [0.029]*** [0.144]***
-0.137 -0.158 -0.14 0.19 0.595 0.188 1 _ t std NH  
   [0.051]*** [0.061]*** [0.052]*** [0.121] [0.071]***  [0.041]***
-0.051 0.517 0.425 -0.144 -0.178 0.144 2 _ t std NH  
   [0.058] [0.080]***  [0.068]*** [0.097] [0.062]***  [0.122] 
0.266 0.203 0.191 0.435 0.342 0.475 3 _ t std NH  
   [0.051]*** [0.053]*** [0.044]*** [0.052]*** [0.034]*** [0.087]***
-0.023 -0.072 -0.061 -0.023 -0.041 0.07 Tappl 
   [0.009]** [0.005]***  [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.003]*** [0.018]***
-1.252 -1.377 -1.233 -1.277 -0.36 -0.781 ldistw 
   [0.145]*** [0.046]*** [0.039]*** [0.045]*** [0.028]*** [0.265]***
1.105 1.36 1.271 1.089 0.214 0.949 DEU_memb 
   [0.130]*** [0.086]*** [0.071]*** [0.079]*** [0.072]*** [0.159]***
0.835 1.408 1.148 0.844 0.464 0.08 Dcolony 
   [0.122]*** [0.054]*** [0.046]*** [0.045]*** [0.036]*** [0.094] 
0.254 0.841 0.683 0.282 0.344 0.392 Dcomm_lang 
   [0.110]** [0.053]***  [0.044]*** [0.045]*** [0.032]*** [0.110]***
            1.075     D_posexp_t-1 
               [0.015]***    
4.375 10.029 9.99 -0.107 1.361 7.861 Constant 
   [1.482]*** [0.523]*** [0.440]*** [1.168] [0.332]***  [2.785]***
Observations  43524 100215 100215 94320 94320 100215
R-squared  0.75               
Standard  errors  in  brackets       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
SAMPLE:  90-06, Importer fixed effects: yes, exporter fixed effects:  yes, product-year fixed 
effects: yes 
  29Table 8 
Robustness checks 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 









1 _ t std H   1.973 0.66 0.094 1.294 0.711 0.467
   [0.088]*** [0.091]*** [0.052]*  [0.055]*** [0.068]*** [0.038]*** 
2 _ t std H   1.98 0.727 0.901 1.517 0.573 0.755
   [0.093]*** [0.120]*** [0.078]*** [0.197]*** [0.205]*** [0.142]*** 
3 _ t std H   1.685 0.726 0.73 2.214 0.938 1.059
   [0.040]*** [0.043]*** [0.030]*** [0.065]*** [0.069]*** [0.048]*** 
1 _ t std NH   -0.321 -0.139 0.578 0.506 -0.096 0.42
   [0.056]*** [0.123]  [0.074]*** [0.095]*** [0.107]  [0.067]*** 
2 _ t std NH   -0.487 0.004 -0.271 0.51 0.338 0.178
   [0.071]*** [0.100]  [0.064]*** [0.201]** [0.208]  [0.147] 
3 _ t std NH   0.832 0.354 0.383 0.839 0.303 0.394
   [0.050]*** [0.053]*** [0.036]*** [0.076]*** [0.079]*** [0.054]*** 
tap1_dif  -0.042 -0.007 -0.044 -0.03 -0.013 -0.028
   [0.005]*** [0.005]  [0.003]*** [0.009]*** [0.010]  [0.007]*** 
ldistw  -1.011 -0.988 -0.365 -1.367 -1.375 -0.426
   [0.048]*** [0.054]*** [0.034]*** [0.044]*** [0.052]*** [0.035]*** 
D_EU membership      0.664 0.829  0.072
      [0.070]***  [0.080]***  [0.073] 
D_colonial relationship  1.163 0.881 0.474 0.978 0.772 0.417
   [0.046]*** [0.047]*** [0.036]*** [0.052]*** [0.052]*** [0.043]*** 
D_common language  0.67 0.294 0.341 0.736 0.373 0.374
   [0.044]*** [0.046]*** [0.032]*** [0.049]*** [0.051]*** [0.037]*** 
D_posexp_t-1     1.037    0.957
     [0.016]***    [0.018]*** 
Constant  7.005 -1.33 -1.652 8.704 0.453 0.578
   [0.414]*** [1.183]  [0.305]*** [0.611]*** [1.232]  [0.460] 














Standard  errors  in  brackets       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
  30Table 9 
Regressions using lagged standards measure 
   -1 -2 -3 -1 -2 -3









1.28 0.297 0.669          1
2 _  t std H  
   [0.087]*** [0.098]***  [0.057]***         
1.461 0.466 0.702          2
2 _  t std H  
   [0.092]*** [0.094]***  [0.061]***         
1.73 0.756 0.767          3
2 _  t std H  
   [0.045]*** [0.046]***  [0.032]***         
0.114 0.14 -0.006          1
2 _  t std NH  
   [0.050]**  [0.066]**  [0.031]          
-0.059 0.206 -0.11          2
2 _  t std NH  
   [0.068]  [0.069]***  [0.044]**          
0.464 0.123 0.217          3
2 _  t std NH  
   [0.052]*** [0.052]**  [0.036]***         
         0.625 -0.012  0.413 1
5 _  t std H  
            [0.093]*** [0.104]  [0.066]***
         0.671 0.179  0.353 2
5 _  t std H  
            [0.094]*** [0.097]*  [0.068]***
         1.456 0.565  0.706 3
5 _  t std H  
            [0.055]*** [0.057]***  [0.041]***
         0.002 0.023  -0.05 1
5 _  t std NH  
            [0.054]  [0.068]  [0.035] 
         0.358 0.267  0.118 2
5 _  t std NH  
            [0.066]*** [0.069]***  [0.047]** 
         0.004 -0.076  0.014 3
5 _  t std NH  
            [0.051]  [0.051]  [0.037] 
-0.049 -0.026 -0.034 -0.024 -0.013 -0.027 tap1_dif 
   [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.003]*** [0.008]*** [0.009] [0.005]***
-1.335 -1.308 -0.405 -1.382 -1.377 -0.43 ldistw 
   [0.040]*** [0.046]*** [0.029]*** [0.043]*** [0.050]*** [0.033]***
1.001 1.048 0.141 0.719 0.891 0.071 D_EU membership 
   [0.070]*** [0.079]*** [0.073]*  [0.071]*** [0.080]*** [0.073] 
1.091 0.843 0.439 1.006 0.785 0.431 D_colonial relationship 
   [0.047]*** [0.046]*** [0.037]*** [0.050]*** [0.050]*** [0.041]***
0.71 0.3 0.358 0.726 0.347 0.371 D_common language 
   [0.046]*** [0.046]*** [0.033]*** [0.048]*** [0.049]*** [0.035]***
      1.029       0.975 D_posexp_t-1 
         [0.016]***       [0.018]***
9.148 5.022 2.277 12.647 7.42 1.373 Constant 
   [0.472]*** [0.693]*** [0.343]*** [0.511]*** [0.739]*** [0.388]***
Observations  88425 88425 88425 70740 70740 70740
Standard  errors  in  brackets       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 













k=1 k=2 k=3 Source: EUESDB (2008)  
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